Over three decades crime counts in England and Wales, as 
Introduction
Distributions are as important as measures of central tendency for applicable research. In the burgeoning literature on the near ubiquitous crime drop of recent years, an emphasis on distributions has arguably been lacking. Yet if (for example) the crime drop has been most marked for those who already suffered relatively little crime (as with regressive taxation) one would be concerned about the disproportionate burden which the most victimised continue to suffer. At the operational policing level, it is crucial to know how the diminished crime burden is distributed, so as to inform resourcing and deployment decisions. A recent paper (Ignatans & Pease, 2015a) showed that the crime drop in England and Wales in recent years was greatest in absolute terms for the most victimised households, but not so great relative to the decline of crime generally as to yield a more even distribution of victimisation. The most victimised came to suffer fewer crimes, but these crimes represented a somewhat higher proportion of the total burden than before. Disaggregation by offence type (Ignatans & Pease, 2015b) showed that the trends were for all practical purposes uniform across crime types.
The crime drop is common across nations. Are the distributional trends also similar cross-nationally? Early analyses of the crime drop were flawed in their exclusive concentration on trends in the USA. This led to the choice as explanatory variables which were specific to that country, such as prison use, police strength and abortion legislation. These variables trended differently in other countries with similar crime drops (Tonry 2014) The intention here, insofar as the data permit, is to examine whether the trends identified in England and Wales extend beyond its borders. Is the slight increase in inequality of distribution of crime evident in England and Wales also evident elsewhere? The implications for crime control are substantial and will be touched upon in the conclusion section.
Main Text
For present purposes, four sweeps of the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) with a total representative adult sample of over 100000 respondents over a decade were utilised. ICVS features victimisation reports over a recall period of one year that were gathered from 25 countries contributing data in at least one sweep. Thirteen of these countries featured in at least two sweeps. The data used in the analyses comes from countries that were surveyed nationally. Roughly 1000-2000 households were interviewed from each country over the phone (NISIS, 1999) . Self-evidently trends require a minimum of two data points to discern so data from twelve countries had to be discarded. The fragmentary nature of the other data, and the fact that the most recent ICVS sweep was in 2000 when the crime drop had been under way for less than a decade, represented challenges. Given the unique nature of the ICVS data and the importance of the topic in the writers' view, it was a challenge worth accepting.
By taking into account the four-year time elapsing between sweeps, national data present in two or more datasets was deemed sufficient for substantive comparisons of trends in victimisation concentration over time. Offences were coded identically in all the sweeps, permitting consistent comparison across time. All thirteen countries are used in the global analyses (Figures 1 to 7) .
Multiple events against the same victim in ICVS are capped to a maximum of five for each offence type. If, for example, someone reports having been assaulted twenty times, the number of assaults is recorded as five. This convention compromises accuracy. The writers' analyses utilising the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) with unlimited incident reporting show many victimisation repeats above the cut-off point of five. The underrepresentation of chronic victims in crime surveys is controversial (Farrell and Pease 2007; Lauritsen et al. 2012) . The pre-imposed ICVS five-count threshold was by necessity retained. The reader should be aware that by doing so the extent of chronic victimisation, and hence the inequality of victimisation, is understated.
When considering measurement of victimisation inequality, a slightly amended approach from that of Lorenz (Lorenz, 1905 ) was adopted. Households were ranked by number of victimisations suffered, the ranked households divided into percentiles, and number of victimisations per percentile for each year calculated. Each percentile's crime could then be expressed as a proportion of the year's total victimisations. This permits detailed comparison of ICVS sweeps and countries.
As noted earlier, Ignatans and Pease (2015b) showed the basic patterns in England and Wales to be similar across crime types. The same approach was applied to ICVS where means and proportions of victimisations by percentile for each crime type.
The figures below thus represent two variables
• mean number of victimisations of a particular crime type suffered by the most victimised percentile, next most victimised, and so on
• the proportion of all victimisations of that type suffered by the most victimised percentile, next most victimised, and so on.
Results
In all the figures the scales should be noted. They differ, being chosen to provide the clearest representation of the key part of the victimisation distribution. Offences were categorised in the appropriate categories in a fashion consistent with previous papers Pease 2015a, 2015b) The decline in crime counts and changes in proportion suffered by the most victimised is much less marked for crimes against the person than for other crime types. As evidenced by previous work (Tseloni et al. 2010b, p To recapitulate, the absolute victimisation of the most victimised has decreased internationally, as the proportion of victimisation suffered by the most victimised 1%
of households has increased. After an initial decline in the early 1990s, the proportion of crimes attributed to the most victimised increased to just below a quarter for vehicle crimes, nearly a half for property crimes and over a third for personal offences.
The next step in the present paper addresses the question of whether the attributes of the heavily victimised households remain similar across time. There is already a substantial literature on attributes associated with crime victimisation (Tseloni et al., 2010 ) (Kershaw & Tseloni, 2005) (Osborn & Tseloni, 1998) (Tseloni, 2006) , but these tend to be analyses at single points in time. Our previous papers examined a number of characteristics available in British data. The only other empirical study of which we are aware which concerns equity if distribution of crime events during the crime drop was the study of domestic burglary of James Hunter and Andromachi Tseloni (Hunter and Tseloni, 2016) . Here the question is whether the variables which distinguish the most victimised households and individuals in 1989 are the same as those which distinguish the most victimised in 2000. The conclusion reached is that the risk factors of 2000 are similar to the risk factors of 1989. Bear in mind that the present analysis says nothing directly about area effects, which will also inform prioritisation of crime prevention effort (Tseloni, 2006) (Kershaw & Tseloni, 2005 ) (Osborn & Tseloni, 1998) . 
Conclusions
Considering the convergence of patterns found in previous analyses limited to
England and Wales and the current international investigation, it appears that with little doubt the cross-national crime drop can be seen as the product of a drop in the count alongside a change in the distribution of crime across households. Around half of all property victimisation is suffered by the 1% of households which are most victimised, as is about one third of personal victimisation. The greater proportion of property relative to personal victimisation differs from the British picture, and is suspected to be an artefact introduced by the capping of crime events. If there are many victims of multiple personal crimes, this reversal of effect would be the result.
Research which is urgently necessary and has been absent from the victimisation survey literature to date has been follow-up interviews with those multiply victimised to confirm the veracity of their accounts. For those accusing multiple victims of confabulation, the question why this confabulation should have declined over time in line with decreased crime counts.
The practical implication made in previous papers should simply be reiterated here.
The concentration of crime prevention effort and resources should be directed at those already victimised. This is even more the case now than was the case before the onset of the crime drop. Repeat victimisation is most likely to occur and (reoccur the most) in households with less favourable economic, geographical and demographic factors, therefore police attention and prevention efforts must be directed towards such households experiencing first victimisation.
